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INTRODUCTION
Brehm and Cohen (1962) note that commitment has two major
theoretical functions. Of prl.mary importance is the implication
of consonant and dissonant elements within the cognitive structure
from which predictions about responses to new information can be
drawn, When actions are taken which provide information dissonant
to that held with commitment to an attitude, Festineer (1957)
delineates severai possible modes of resolution including alteration
of overt behavior, alteration of the environment to which dissonant
elements correspond, or addine new elements which are consonant
with previous information, Secondarily, commitment increases
resistance of the cognitive elements to alteration, making some
modes of dissonance reduction more likely than others. Dissonance
theory holds that the element least resistant to chanee will
define the mode of resolution (Festinger, 1957). Commitment provides
a highly specific element in an otherwise indistinct construction
of implied cognitions. As such it will be very resistant to change:
•••dissonance aroused in connection with a commitment is
likely to be reduced by change in elements other than those
Involved in commitment, If a person chooses A of two alternatives,
A & B, he is not likely to reduce the resulting dissonance
by saying that his choice was wrong and that he should have
chosen B[3rehm and Cohen, 1962, p. 9).
The effect of commitment in the dissonance formulation is.
essentially constrictive, reducing the number of variable elements
and placing restrictions on the way in which other pert1nent elements
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may be changed in the course of dissonance reduction. Commitment
is therefore seen as an anchorinf, element in the cognitive system
from which specific effects may be predicted, As such, it occupies
a. central role in empirical tests of dissonance theory,
Because commitment provides relatively clear specification
of consonant and dissonant coenitions, it also provides
rather readily a condition under which many aspects of the
theory can be tested. Where a person can be clearly committed
to a given behavior or decision, information that is unRmbi~
uously inconsistent with that commitment should creRte dissonance
and the individual should rr.an:i.fest attempts to reduce that
dissonance. In the absence of other forces, a. failure to find
attempts at dissonance reduction under t.hese conditions would
be clear evidence against the theory [Brehm and Cohen, 1962,
p.

9].

In the design of empirkal t.csts, att0ntion has b'?cn e;iven to
what behaviors constitute commitment. These tests of theory require
unequivocal explanation in terms of the theory. Brehm arrl Cohen (1962)
point out that many attitude chanGe paradir,ms are ambiGUOus with
regard to the interrelationships of the variables and are consoquontly
open to interpretation by judgemental principles as well as dissonance
theory. Commitment clarifies these relationships in

di~onance

terms:

What these studies illustrate is that when subjects com..mit
themselves to exposure to a piece of discrepant information,
dissonance is aroused by the inconsi5tcncv between their
commitment behavior and ~ inttial attitude~ and not by
the inconsistency between the communjcation and their initial
attitudes. They can then only chanr:e their attitooes in line
with the communication to which they have exposed themselves,
and do so differentially, dependine on the amount of dissonance
they have experienced., It is this sort of situation that is
entirely closed to judgemental interpretation and rather
unequivocally explained by the dissonance formulation [Brehm
and Cohen, 1962, p. 11-1].
Actual performance of a counterattitudinal act is then unnecessary
to produce detectable dissonance effects whenever commitment is
obtained·. Rather, mere commitment to such a position should be
sufficient for dissonance arousal, with reduction following one
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of the methods predicted by dissonance theory (e.g., attitude
shift). Empirical support is found in several forced compliance
studies. In. Brock and Blackwood (1962) ~s in either high or low
justification conditions were asked to commit themselves to write
a counterattitudinal essay by signing the title p.-1.ge. High justification
~s

were given a number of reasons to argue against their own position

by

~.

such as helping to solve social problems and aidine; in the

advancement of science. Low justification
ment from

~.

~s

received no encourage-

An attitrule questionnaire was then completed before

composing the essay, Results were in agreement with dissonance
theory in that

~s

in the low justification condition exhibited

greater attitude shift toward the counteratt:i.tudinal position
than those in high justification, both without performinr; the
discrepant behavior. In Rabbie, Brehm, and Cohen (1959) a similar
design was used in which half of the

~s

received the attitude

measure before writing a counterattitudinal essay, and half after,
Varying conditions of inducement were employed in both groups,
The results indicate that attitude shift occurred concomittant
with inducement level for both groups, Both studies are in agreement
with dissonance predictions on the basis of high or low justification,
and demonstrate that in some form, commitment alone is capable
of arousing dissonance in ccmjunctfon _with low task justification.
Brehm and Cohen's (1962) assertion that commitment is in fact the
variable that is responsibl.e for dissonance arousal is given some
credibility but support is clouded by the presence of the traditional
kingpin variable in dissonance theory, low justification, of which
the Ss

~ere

well aware at the time of attitude shift measurement.
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This cognitve element, the knowledge that counterattitudinal
effort would in the future be required. with low justification,
is alone enough to meet theory requirements for dissonance prcxiuction
and subsequent change, lea.vine; the only clear function of cor.imitment
in these designs to be

~n

anchoring effect.-

In order to determine the role of commitment behavior in
its own right as a dissonance producing variable, and its consequent
effect on-attitude change, it is necessary to delineate more clearly
what behavior constitutes commitment. Additionally, commitment must
be described in terms that are ame.nable to use as operational
definitions. Manipulation as a variable would otherwlse be
impossible. Before this can be done a distinction must be made
between public and private commitment.
Forced choice studies often indicate commitment as a variable
under manipulation by presenting 2_s with discrepant information
under high or low reinforcement for participation in the experiment
(cf. Brehm and Cohen, 1962). Commitment is inferred by the act of
S's consent to listen to such communication, or to perform a
consonant or dissonant act. While in agreement with dissonance
theory, such.commitment is ambiguous. In a study by Kiesler, Pallak 1
and Kanouse (1968) the investigators describe their commitment
manipulation as ''varied by telling the subject that the speech,
which advocated. a position consistent with the subject's own,
would be ma.de public or remain anonymous[p. 332]." Each§_ in the high
commitment condition read a consonant speech (prepared. by ~) arainst
college tuition increases. Each §_ was told his speech would
be heard as nart of a nationwide study, that the audience
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would probably think the opinions expressed were his own, and to
include his name, address, and age. Low commitment §_s were told
that the tapes would be chopped up and reassembled, guaranteeing
arlonymity. Dissonance was manipulated by providing high and low
choice conditions with regard to participation in the counterattitudinal task, writing an essay favoring greater similarity
between public and private schools (e.g., tuition increases).
The

~s

report significant differences between dissonance and control

groups, indicating that the choice manipulation was effective.
However, no significant effects of the commitment conditions alone
were found (t's< 1.0); the contribution of the commitment variable
on attitude change was in the form of an interaction with dissonance
levels (p

<.05).

Low prior commitment on a related topic enhanced

dissonance effects and attitude shift in the counterattitudinal
direction. High commitment had the opposite effect, essentially
counteracting dissonance.
The dissonance results themselves are typical of forced compliance
studies, while the effect of commitment is notable for its apparent
neutrality. Examination of the commitment manipulation shows it
to be basically one of forced choice by assignment to threatening
(nationwide audience) or non-threatening (anonymous) conditions.
Rather than consonant commitment, the Es may have manipulated
threats to self-esteem, resulting in differential attention toward
the content of the prepared speeches. It is possibly the cognitive
elements formulated in the delivery of the speech that interacted
with the dissonance manipulation to produce the experimental

resuits;

and

not the act of

commitment itseif. In addition, as in
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most forced choke studies, attitude measurement was taken after
both the commitment and dissonance manipulations, making it impossible
to determine the effects of either alone. Conditions necessary for
a distinction between public and private commitment did not obtain.
The confusion rega:r:tling the conditions that constitute commitment
characteristic of this study has been common to studies of commitment
as a contributing variable, Due to the design of forced compliance
or free choice, and to the indirect nature of the dissonance
formulation itself, the generation of commitment

in

£s is implied

through justification levels and the like rather than specified
or demonstratod directly.
The value of public commitment as a variable lies in its
explicitness for both £and

~.

Its anchoring function within the

dissonance framework is explained by Festinger:
The first and foremost source of resistance to chane;e for any
cognitive element is the responsiveness of such elements to
reality ••• Given this strong and sometil!'es over'l-:helming responsiveness to reality, the prob10m of changine a behavioral,:cog.:. · nitive element-becomes'the problem of chan5ing the behavior
which is mapped by the element. Consequently, the resistance
to change of the cognitive element is identical with the
re::;fotance to change of the bAhavior refln6too by that element,
assuming the person maintains contact with reality [ FestinF,er,

1957, p. 25].
The explicitness of commitment specifies what behavior is being
mapped, and consequently, what is likely to change as a result of
dissonance, Private

co~~itment

as utilized in many experiments is

described 6nly in terms of the behavtor:· 1t·:changes' (e.g.,~: if'"there
is much attitude change, £must have been committed very little;

if ~ is resistant to change, he was highly committed), Public
commitment is overt and discrete for

~and ~'

and so cannot be

denied without altering reality, providing a variable which anchors
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the relevant cognitive elements into a set of relatively

invarian~

relationships until new salient information is forthcoming.
Studies using the public commitment variable as a cognitve
anchor within the design have confirmed its effectiveness in behaviormapping element change. In conformity experiments involving stimulus
matching, commitment may be regarded as a crucial anchoring point
in the decisional process of stimulus judgement around which other
elements may vary (e.g., social conformity or independence; Deutch
and Gerard, 1955; Gerard, 1963). Commitment has been treated in a
similar manner with regard to its effectiveness on dissonance
reduction through information seeking in both free choice (Cohen,
Brehm, and Latan~ 1959; Adams, 1961) and forced compliance designs
(Sears and Freedman, 1963). These examples characterize commitment
as an either-or decisional phenomenon fitting neatly into dissonance
theory (Brehm and Cohen, 1962, p. 113). But recent evidence indicates
that depicting public commitment as a single binary event is incomplete,
and although it serves adequately as a variable within dissonance
theory, effects on attitudes have been observed following public
commitment other than that to which dissonance can be applied
(Jellison and Mills, 1969; Kiesler and Sakumura, 1966).
In their rncxiel for commitment, Kiesler_and Sakumura (1966)
define commitment as a binding of the individual to overt behavioral
acts, the strength of commitment being determined by a number of
variables including the explicitness and irrevocability of the act.
In this, and in a similar stud! (Nuttin, 1966), attitude measurement
was taken after both commitment and performance of the consonant
action, A more recent study (Jellison and Mills, 1969) retained
explicit commitment but separated commitment from performance by
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interposition of the attitude measure. Jellison and Mills found
in their first experiment, investigating the effect of public
commitment on opinion change after forewarning of a persuasive
attack, that §.s' private opinions became more extreme when they
committed themselves to argue against proposals which they opposed.
§.s were asked their-views on several educational issues, and if
opposed to them, commitment was then obtained by getting §. to
agree to make a tape recording of his position against two of these
issues which he was told would be played before national audiences.
After indicating that he would make the tape recordings each §.
was asked to sign a release thereby firmly committing himself.
A

Likert-type opinion questionnaire was then administered, con-

taining items directly related to those on which §. had declared
his pos:i.tion, and items of the.same type (educational issues) on
which he was not publicly committed. It was found that §.s were
significaatly more negative on committed positions than uncommitted
(p

<.05).

In the second part of their exp~Timent (essentially a

replication) Jellison and Mills obtained similar results. ~s were
asked their views on two educational proposals (different from the
first experiment), and if favorable, were asked to make a tape
recording of them on one of the issues. Commitment was made explicit
in a manner similar to the first experiment, signing a card declaring
support for the proposals. Attitu:le was determined by a Likerttype scale, as in the first experiment. Results were in agreement
with the first experiment:

after~ ·public

commi tl'nent · Ss' 'opinions

became more strongly in favor of a position they originally favored

(F= 16.61, 1 & 19 df, p<.01).
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The results cannot be explained in terms of dissonance in
that Ss were not asked to provide arguments against their own
position, nor did they receive any discrepant information or choose
between high and low justification conditions. It is notable that
the attitude measure was taken before the performance of any consonant activity, clearly isolating commitment as the salient
variable, Jellison and Mills suggest the possibility

••• that the

performance of the consonant action ma:y: in some way reduce the effect
which the commitment to perform the action has on opinions[p. Jh6]." A
cognitive explanantion is offered for the results. Commitment
may have increased the Ss' desire to be correct and to be certain
of the validity of the arguments to be used in the tape recordings,
Jellison and Mills contend that thinking of arguments in favor of
thei.r own side and against the opposing position would cause the

Ss to take a more extreme position.
It has been shown that overt commitment to an act or position
is a salient variable in attitude change both as the result of
dissonance reduction and in designs to which dissonance does not
apply. While it has often been used as an anchoring variable,
commitment as a variable with: independent effects has been neglected.
The present experiment has been designed to investigate the effects
of public commitment in both dissonance ani non-dissonance contexts
while eliminating much of the ambiguity of effect resulting from
inferential methois of manipulation.
A number of specific hypotheses were drawn for the experimental
conditions designed to meet these criteria. Jellison and Mills (1969)
found that when " ••• subjects committed themselves to make a tape
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recording of a position they favored, their private opinions
became J!lOre strongly in favor of that position. ( p •. 345]." An
experimental condition, Commitment Only-Consonance (CO-C) was designed to
correspond to the Jellison and Mills experiment, providing attitude
measurement after overt commitment to a consonant position, but
before performance of the committed. act. It was predicted that
within CO-C a significant amount of attitude shift toward the
extreme of the position originally held would be shown between
the attitude measures (a Pretest~ taken before commitment, and a
Posttest, taken after). A second consonance condition, Commitment
with Argument-Consonance ( CA-C), differed only from the first in
that attitude measurement is preceded by both commitment and
performance of the argument. Predicting from Jellison and Mills'
speculations, CA-C would show positive change between the Pretest
and Posttest, but significantly less than CO-C. These results would
imply that performance of a consonant ·action reduces ··the effect
of

commit~ent

information

on attitude, possibly through the presence of competing

~may

cognize while formulating the argument.

Rabbie, Brehm, and Cohen (1959) suggest that there may be
two ways to reduce dissonance resulting from the decision to argue
a discrepant position: " ••• once the indivdiual has made the decision
to take the discrepant stand, the ensuing dissonance can be reduced.
by attitude change 2!. by actually verbalizing the stand. To the

extent that he does one, he need not do the other (p. 414 ]."The present
dissonance· manipulation will provide exactly these conditions. In the
first dissonance condition, Commitment Only-Dissonance (CO-D), the
Posttest will take place after a discrepant stand had been committed,
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but before verbalization of that stand, The second dissonance
condition, Co;nmitment with ArGument-Dissonance (CA-D), provides
verbalization (the areument) before the Posttest. If change in
CO-D were due to the effects of dissonance reduction through attitude
shift,

~s

would become significantly more negative toward the originally

held position. CA-D however would show no such effect, since dissonance
reduction would have taken place before attitud.e measurement. It was
predicted, then, that CO-D would be more·negative ihan CA-D, reflecting
the effects of dissonance reduction throueh attitude shift .QE. verbalization
in response to the same dissonance-producing conditions.
In addition to a check on temporal factors the Control condition
will provide information in two areas. Tho items used in the investigation
are themselves controversial topics: events in the news during the
course of the experiment could conceivably inf1.uence the responses of
the entire sa:nple, or possibly a subgroup (one sex or the other).
Secondly, attitude measurement will be done under very different settings
between the Pretest and Posttest. The Control results will provide a
check on the possible placebo effects of measurement jtself under the
one to one setting of the experimental room with equipment present.
No significant differences were predicted within the Control group.
There is little information available in the literature on
the functions of commitment in attitude change, and what is there,
for the most part, is theoretical speculation about the role of
commitment in fixing the positions of attitude elements prior to
change. The small amount of actual data relates the act of commitment
to gross attitude change without separating it from the attitudes
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to which

§. is committed., essentially confounding the effects of

.either the attitude change or commitment. The primary purpose of the
present study was therefore to determine the effects of commitment
alone as contrasted with the customary treatment of commitment plus
accompanying argument. Together tbese alternative treatments constitute
the

Com.~itment

Factor.

Attitude change takes place in any context under one of two
fundamental conditions, consonance or dissonance. While it is true
that no two attitude elements are entirely consonant £!:.dissonant
with each other, the predomj_nant relationship between them can
always be characterized as consonant, dissonant, or irrelevant, and
the direction of attitude change inferred from the prevailing condition,
In the absence of any clear data differentiating between the function
of commitment under consonance and dissonance, the experiment was
designed to allow a clear comparlson between the effects .of each
commitment treatment as they occurred under both conditions. The
second major factor was therefore the Consonance-Dissonance conditions.
In order to determine the reliability of responses to the
experimental items, the entire 31 item scale was administered to
an equivalent sample of

~s

in a pilot study prior to the actual

experiment, Two Hews were found to prcxiuce about
responses in the desired ranges

30%

of the

(?-9 for Topic 1, 3-5 for Topic 2).

These ranges were chosen to allow

t

dete~able

change in either direction.

The final critical items are as follows:
Topic 1 - "Federal government aid for the construction of
schools is long overdue, and should be instituted as perm:tnent policy."
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Topic 2 - "This country should disarm regardless of whether or
not other countries do" (see Appendix A).

11+

METHOD

Subjects. 100 §_s were chosen from the undergraduate Psychology
classes at the University of Richmond.
Apparatus. The experiment was conducted in a room containing two
tables, two chairs, and a tape recorder with microphone. A stopwatch was used to time the recordings.
Desirn

~nd

Procedure. The experiment was performed in two parts,

following a four factbr repeated measures design with repetition
on one factor. The first part involved the assessment of the Ss'
attiturres before'the experimental manipulation, and was conducted
in a group format. The second part was the experimental manipulation
and immediate assessment of attitude change, conducted individually
with each

~.

Attitude measurement in both parts was done using a

subform of an eleven-point Likcrt-type scale constructed for use
in this experiment (see Appendix A). The data consisted of the
mean values of the critical items (those to which§. was asked to
commit himself in the experimental manipulations), and was analyzed
by a 2x2x2x2 Analysis of Variance with appropriate post-hoc.tests

to locate sources of variance,
The Pretest was administered in booklet form ·•r.Hh a cover
sheet and instructions, followed by two pages of attitude items,
~s

signed their names on the first

passed out, instructions

~ere

~age.

After the booklets were

read to the group by

~.
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Only §_s whosry response on either of the critical items was
between three and five or seven and nine

w~re ret~ine<l

secona. p3:r+.• These rane;es allowed for the detection of

for the
sir:nifi~~nt

attHude shifts in either direction ns a rc;,ult of the manipulations.
§.s in the a-ppropriate ranees were randomly asslgned t.o one of the
experimental conditions (or Control) for the second part, with the
restriction that the male-female ratio was he1d approximately const<mt
within each cell (Kfosler, Pallak, and Kanouse, 1968, found a consil::;tent
difference of attitude on some topics between the sexes).
In the second pg.rt the experimental groups ·to which §.s were
assigned were as follows:
CO-C: Consonance condition (commitment to argue for a topic
which~ favored, or against a topic which !?_opposed), measurement

of commitment effect on attitude before argument.
CA-C: Consonance condition, measurement of commitment effect
after argument.
CO-D: Dissonance condition (commitment to argue against a topic
which §.. favored, or for a topic which §.. opposed), measurement before
argument.
CA-D: Dissonance condition, measurement after areument.
Control: Control condition receiving identical measurement
conditions and instruments without commitment or argument manipulations.
This :Paradigm was designed to control·effectively the operation
of variables salient to the effects of commitment on attitude shift:
CO-C provided a test on the effects of consonant public commitment
alone in that only the declaration of commitment preceded the attitude
change measurement (Posttest): CA-C indicated the role played by
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commitment and performance of the consonant argument, both preceding
measurement; CO-D was designed to detect any differential effect of
commitment alone under dissonance, and was otherwise comparable to
CO-C: CA-D was the dissonance couterpart of CA-C, the effect of both
commitment and argument,
After formation of the experimental and Control groups, another
experiment was announced to the group, described as unrelated to
the first part, A sheet was passed around on which

e_s

signed up

for individual tine periods to record arguments, The names of the
Ss in the condition being run appeared at the top of the sheet, and
§.s were instructed to sign only if their name was on the list.
The purpose of this was disguised for the §_s,
The following instructions were read to each

~

in the experimental

room:
11

As I explained in class, this is an experiment in the cognitive

organization of concepts, In this part I am interested in finding out
how people organize arguments (for/against, depending on condition)
controversial subjects on very short notice, that is, when they have
relatively little time to think about the arguments. The arguments
are recorded for analysis later on by several professors and. graduate
students of the Psychology Department, In order that we can

kee~

track of the variables, you will be asked to record your·name before
the argument if you agree to record !?..!!£ (stressed), Now, in order to
completely randomize the topics, I would like you to choose one·of
these four cards (face down on the table) • They have the topics on
the other side. (§..chose one, E removed the rest from sight, face
down), What topic did you get? (~showed ~the ca:rd; actually, all

are identical). Almost everyone so far has agreed to record an
argument, even if they did not know much about their topic. I would
like you to sign this release allowing us to use your tape for the
experiment, and as a record of your agreement." If§. refused, he
was asked to take the Posttest, thanked, and allowed to leave,
If §. agreed, he signed the sheet which states that he gives
all rights to his tape recording to the University of Richmond
Department of Psychology to use for scientific purposes, Verbal
agreement and signing constituted public commitment to the topic.
The procedure for each manipulation was as follows:
CO-C: Before proceding with the recording §. was told that-· further
information was needed and was given the Posttest. When fj_nished,

S was

told he had five minutes to formulate and record an argument

consonant with his position on the topic, and the timer was started,
Scratch paper was provided for making an outline of the argument.
£_ was reminded. to include his name before the argument,
CA-C: £_preceded directly from commitment to recording. Instructions
were the same as in CO-C. When the recording was finished S was told that
further information was needed, and the Posttest was administered.
CO-D: The procedure was identical to CO-C but commitment and
argument were against

~'s

own position as determined by the Pretest.

CA-D: Identical to CA-C but commitment and argument were against
S's own position.
Control:
S
.
- entered the experimental room and received. instructions
"This is an experiment in the cognitive organization of concepts.
I am interested. in finding out how people organize their ideas
about various subjects. I would like you to read the instructions

.
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on this sheet (the Posttest) and then answer the questions."
When the Post,test was com!'leted, 2_ was thankeo and allowed to leave.
The study wa.s cond11c+.ed ·with th"'
design

characteri:>ti~

Fr0"!".est-manipulatlon-P0<>t.t,,,~+,

of most, attitude change research. Accordine;ly,

the dependent variable was the magni hide and d'irection of change
following each Topic X Condition X Treatment.combination, .as measured
along the eleven-point scale. In all, the design was a four factor
2x2x2x2 with repitition on the last factor. An Analysis of Variance
was carried out on the raw data (the ~s' scores) to determine the
relative influence of each of the factors across trials. It.will be
recalled the

~s

were chosen for participation in the experiment

on the basis of their Pretest responses to one- of the two topics,
that is, they responded within the 7-9 range for Topic 1 (schools)
or the

3-5

range for Topic 2 (disarmament). When the data were combined

for the final analysis tM.s arbitrary Pretest score difference,_
included as raw data, would have j_ndicated a significant difference
between the Ss on the basis of the stimulus attitude when in fact
the difference was an artifact of the design. Accordingly, each score
of all 2_s in Topic 2

(3-5

range) was converted from its original

value to the corresponding value in the 7-9 range to allow a nonconfounded analysis along a single scale. The choice of Topic 2 for
conversion was also arbitrary, with the purpose of simplifyins- the
meaning of the numerical results. Done this way, consonant change
was indicated by the positive direction, dissonant change by the
negative. The same factor relationships would have been obtained
had Topic 1 been converted,1 but interpretation would have been
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confusing because of this direction of change. fhe relative direction
and absolute value of the scores was not altered by this procedure
so that any variance indicated by the analysis reflected an actual
difference between the effects of the topics on other factors.
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RESULTS

From Table I it can be seen that a basic hypothesis of the
study was given some support. The significant B X C X D interaction

(F= 6.03, 1 and 38 df, p < ,025) indicates systematic differe!lces
between the Commitment groups under Consonant and Dissonant conditions.
The simple effects analysis shows' that differences between the groups
on the Pretest (D1 ) were nonsignificant (Table II) demonstrating
that the experimental manipulations were the source of the significant
variance found between the groups at the Posttest (D ) level (Table
2
III f F= 5. 71, 3 and 76 df, p. < •00 5). T-tests bet ween the Post test
means (Table IV) of groups CO-C and CA~ (C at,B 1 ) demonstrated
the significantly greater effect of Commitrn9nt with Argument on
consonant attitude change (tobs= 3,94, 38 df, p <.001). However,
the difference between the Dissonance groups was nonsignificant.
Thus, the simple effects analysis of the B X C X D interaction
clearly disconfirmed the hypothesized function of commitment as a
factor capable of producing attitude change by itself. The superiority
of Coritmitment with Argument was only clear, however, under Consonant
conditions, perhaps indicating a difference in the basic function of
commitment between Consonance and Dissonance. But inspection of
Figure 1 shows that the same pattern of relationships was obtained
for both Consonance and Dissonance groups, implying the difference
is one of magnitude only. Post-hoc tests were conducted on the
Pretest-Posttest data to assess the effects of the manipulations
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TABLE

I. SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

Source

SS

df

~

F

Total

407.77

159

Between

232. 75

79

11.37

1

11.37 4.55

<.0.5

6.39

1

6.39 2.56.

ns

c (Com.Only/Com. Argument)

4.22

1

AX B

2.17

1

AXC

10.68

1

10.68 4.27

<.05

BX C

16,92

1

16,92 6.77

<.025

.72

1

Errorbetween

180.28

72

Within Subjects

227.49

80

D (Trials)

5,62

1

AX D

5.30

1

BX D

14.42

1

C XD

9.05

1

AX BX D

.30

1

AX(}XD

.93

1

BX C X D

14.35

A (Stimulus)
B

(Consonance/Dissonance)

AX BX C

AXBXCXD

Errorwithin

2.50

5,62 2.36

il~.42

ns

6.06

<.05

9.05 3.80

ns

1

14.35 6.03

<.02.5

6.13

1

6.13 2.58

171.39

72

2.38

ns
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TABLE II. srvrr.E EFFP.r.TS-G?OUPS AT D1 (T'~.F1'EST)

Source

SS

df

T9tal

281+3 .1

79

Between groups
Errorwi'th'in groups

,66

J

53,54

76

ms

F

l?.

.22

.31

ns
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TABLE IIT. SIMPLE: E~FIBCTS-GROUPS AT D (POSTTE:ST)
2

Source
Total
Between Groups
Errorwithin groups

SS

df

347.95

79

64.05
283.90

ms

F

3

21.35

5.71

76

3.74

<.005
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TABLE IV.

PPET~ST

AND POSTTSST t-lEA!;S OF EXPERIHENTAL GROUPS

Pre (D ) Post (D ) Mean Diff.
2
1
Com. Only

8,30

7,45

t values(Post)

,85
3,94 (p<.001)

Consonance
Com./Argument

8,20

Com, Only

8.5.5

1.30

,67 (ns)

Dissonance
Com./Argument

8.3.5

1.10

25
FIGURE 1 , ' HEANS OF EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS
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within each e;roup (Table V), The results further support, the notion
that Commitment with Argument is more effective tharr Commitment Only
in that no significant change was observed within the Commitment Only
groups, but CA-D e_s did show significant negative change after delivering the argument (p<.05). The pattern evident from the results shows a
similarity in the function of commitment under both Consonance and
Dissonance, but also indicate the Dissonance effect is somewhat
reduced in magnitude,
Table I also shows an unexpected significant A X C interaction

(P-= 4,09, 3 and 76 df, p <.05). An analysis of Commitment levels
by Topic (Table VI) shows the difference between groups to be significant (F= 3,05, 3 and 76 df, p <.05). Simple effects t-tests were
then done in order to differentiate between the effectiveness of the
Commitment treatments for each stimulus attitude (Table VII).
No significant differences in the relative effectiveness of either
Commitment treatment were found on Topic 1 (C at A1 ), but Commitment
with Argument was found to have resulted in significantly greater
change than Commitment Only on Topic 2 (C at A2 ; tobs= 4.03, J8 df,
p <. 001). Figure 2 illustrates these relationships, implying that
the process which resulted. in the greater overall effectiveness
of the Commitment with Argument manipulation was potentiated by
some conceptual aspect of Topic 2.
Since the topics used as stimulus factors were current and
somewhat controversial there was a possibility that events in the
news might affect the

~s'

attitudes as the data collection progressed,

confounding the experimental effects. A Control group was therefore
run for each Topic; concurrent with the other data collection,
to ascertain the influence of current events. The Control group
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TABLE V. EFFECT OF TRIALS BY GROUP (POST-HOC)

Source

SS

df

ms

F

:P.

TrialsGroup CO - C

7.22

1

7.22

3.03 <.10

TrialsGroup CA-C

17.00

1

17.00

7.14 <.01

TrialsGroup CO-D

?.22

1

?.22

3.03 <.10

Trials Group CA-D

12.10

1

12.10

5.08 <.05

171.39

72

2.38

Errorwi•thi n groups
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TABLE VI. SIMPLE EFFJ<~CTS-COMMITMENT TREATMENTS BY TOPIC

Source

SS

df

Total

5436.00

79

37.45

3

12.48

310.50

76

4.09

Between [7oups
Errorwith"in groups

ms

F

3.05 <.05
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TABLE VII. MEANS OF CO'M"BINF.D COMMIT'MF.'NT GROUFS BY TOPIC

Topic

Commitment Only
Commitment/Argument

te.22, 3&if t=4.0), J8df
(ns)
(p <,001)
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FIGURE 2. SIM?LE EFFE!.-CTS OF COMMITMENT AIID TOPIC

10

A (Disarmament)
2
9

Group
8

Mean

~=--------;_----------9• A1

(Schools)

•
7

Ci
(Commitment Only)

c

(Commitment wi~h Argument)

J1
data could not be included in the Analysis of Variance because it
was designed as a check on the stability of the data and not as a
no-treatment comparison group, Control

~s

were not asked to commit

themselves, or given any dissonance-producing information, These
procedural differences prevented. direct comparison of the Control
and experimental groups, A t-test for related means was performed
on the Control group data, and detected no significant differences
for either Topic (Table VIII),
In all the results presented a pattern of relationships

which indicated that Commitment with Argument was more effective
in producing attitude change than Commitment Only, that the function
of Commitment with Argument was the same for both Consonance and
Dissonance, but that the magnitude of change produced was lower
under Dissonance, This magnitude

d~fference

was further amplified

in the present study by one of the Topics (disarmament), suggesting
that some cognitive factor altered the relative power of.commitment,,
While it was not predicted that the two attitude stimuli should
produce any differential effect, the possibility existed that the
Ss might react to them or to the experimental situation in some
systematic way in terms of personal involvement, effort put into
the argument, or the quality of the argument as

~

perceived it.

A short debriefing questionnaire was given, allowing each §. to
estimate the influence of these factors on an eleven-point scale,

-

with a final onen-ended question designed to find whether S had
~

discovered the purpose of the manipulations. None of the

~s

questioned

reported any interpretation of the experiment other than.that
described by

~

in the instructions. Table IX summarizes the question-

naire results. This data could not be included in the main analysis
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TABLE VIII, COJli'TROL GROUP MEANS

Pretest

Post test

Mean difference

Topic 1

8,0

7,8

.2

ns

Topic 2

4.1

3.5

.6

ns
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TABLE IX. QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS-RESPONSE MEANS

Topic 1
n

1

2

CO-C

8

5.0

CA-C

5

7.6
5,2

.1
5.0

4,4

CO-D

9

8,2

CA-D

7

5.0

Topic 2

4

n

1

2

1

4

8

5,0

7.2
6,0

9

7,6
5.8

6,7
5.5

6.6
5.0

7,6
6.5

6.2

6,2

7,0

8

7.2

5,2

6,5

6,8

4.4

4,7

4,8

7

6,8

4,5

4,1

6,1

since the questionnaire was introduced after the beginning of data
collection and not all §.s were given the opportunity to respond.
Although the number of §.s per group was the same, the number
responding ranged from five to nine. In lieu of statistical analysis
the questionnaire data show no apparent pattern between the Topics
or groups, indicating no systematic bias along a particular factor.

DISCUSSION
The experiment sought to clarify two aspects of the attitude
change process: a) the effectiveness of commitment itself, and
b)'the functions of commitment under both consonance and dissonance,
The results provided information on both of these points, and also
indicated some effects of the conceptual properties of the attitude
sti.mulus on the relationships between other factors, Together these
findings illustrate the operation of several major factors in
attitude change,
The significant B X C X D interaction indicated that the effectiveness of commitment varied between the Consonance and Dissonance
conditions, The simple effects analysis showed that contrary to
predictions, Commitment with Argument (Group CA-C) was sitrnificantly
more effective than Commitment Only (Group CO-C, p

< .001), clearly

disconfirmtn!! comnitment itself as the factor 1'.'ebponsible for consonant
attHude chane;e, The same pattern of results obtained for the Dissonance
groups at a level below sirrnificance, although chane;e within the CA-D
group did reach sign~ficance (p<,05) as did change within.the comparable
Consonance group, CA-C (p < ,01). ·Looking at the pattern presented by
the.commitment factors it is apparent that the results were consistent:
the change within Commitment Only groups was of marginal significance
(p(.10) with an identical Pretest-Posttest mean difference of .85;
change within both Commitment with Argument groups was sie:niffoant,
occurred in the expected directions, and differed only in magnitude,

the Dissonance erou-p beinp; somewhat

reduc~d. Thi~

implies that

the difference between groups CO-D and CA-D djd not reach sie;nificance
due to the lower magnitude of chant:e produced in Group CA-D, fodica.ting
a similar function of commitment for both consonance and dissonance,
but that the power of the experimental manipulation was reduced by
some factor unique to dissonance.
Since the main thrust of the study was to isolate commitment
as a factor, the Commitment Only manipulation was comprised of task
instructions and exposure to the attitude stimulus, followed by
the commitment act itself. As was shown, this produced only marginal
results. The Commitment with Argument treatment included task
instructions, exposure to the stimulus, and commitment, followed
by delivery of the argument. This treatment therefore consisted of
many more cognitive elements and processes preceding the attitude
measurement than the Commitment Only treatment;. The pattern of
significant results therefore indicates the commitment difference
was due to something occurring during formulation and delivery of
the argument. It follows that the magnitude difference found
between the Consonance-Dissonance conditions also had its origin
in these processes as a subsidiary effect.
Change could have been due either to different processes
occurring under each manipulation, or to a different combination
of factors interacting within the same basic framework. The consistency of the results between conditions strongly supports this second
idea. Differences between the number and type of elements entering
into the basic process would have resulted in varied amounts of
change conconlant with the nature of the manipulation. Character-
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ization of attitude change in these terms does not imply that
it is a fixed stimulus-processing program which passively adjusts
§_'s attitudes to be congruent with new stimuli. Rather, the data
suggest that a dynamic interaction takes place between new and
pre-existing information in a continual reassessment of the relationships between cognitively relevant elements. The framework of this
process is indicated by regularities of response shift found to
be associated wi+,h particular antecedents, lit tM_s case the components
of the treatment levels.
In order to specify the function of commitment as an antecedent in this scheme, it is necessary to examine the processes
which took place at each level as they relate to a general model
of attitude change.
Cognitive consistency or balance models of attitude change
posit a fundamental drive towa!tl psychological agreement between
all cognitive elements of which a person becomes aware through stimuli
impinging from the environment. The resolution of inconsistency in
this model usually takes the form of the addition or averaging of
new information with old to arrive at a balance between the original
and new positions on a given attitude cluster, While complete
consistency is rarely achieved, the balance process takes place
to maximize agreement even if information must be distorted or
ignored. A variety of models have been devised to account for
behavior under specific stimulus conditions (Rokeach, 1969; Feldman,

1968; Anderson, 1968; Cartwrif,ht
baum,

anrl Harary,

1956; Osgocxi and Tannen-

1955), taking the general conceptual form
Pressure toward change

l:NP( n~w)

= ·~NF( orig1na
- . l)

[ 1]

~8

where N = the number of relevant attitude elements in each cluster
and P

= the avera,ge weight given the cluster as determined by the

relative importance of the individual elements, The inducement to
change an attitude position is seen to be equal to the ratio of
new attitude elements to old, each weighted by its importance
(adapted from Kiesler, Collins, and Miller, 1969, p. 195). In this
model the valence of a cluster (consonant or dissonant) would not in
itself alter the amount of change resulting from new stimuli but
would instead. dictate the direction of change when a resolution mode
had been determined, The addition of a large number of cognitive
elements, of any level of importance, would then be suffi.cient to
alter the ratio to produce detectable change,

By characterizing the study which originally suggested the
comnitment hypothesis in terms of Equation [1], it becomes clear
why the present Commitment Only manipulation failed to produce
significant results. Jellison and Mills (1969) found that. §.s became
more extreme on several educational issues which they originally
opposed following public commitment to argue against them, This was
also found to occur when §.s committed themselves to argue for
positions which they favored. There is no indication that the
proposals used in the Jellsion and Mills study were relatively more
important to the §.s than the topics used here. The strength of
commitment in the Jellison and Mills study was potentiated by
virtue of the fact that it included a large number of cognitive
elements derived from commitment to several topics simultaneously.
In this study commitment on either topic was made to a single,
rather specific proposition conprised of relatively few attitude
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elements. Considered according to Equation [1], the Commitment Only
treatments added few new elements beyond the pre-existing position
and so resulted in low inducement and questionable change.
It is clear from the results of the Commitment with Argument
groups that the behavior which followed actual

co~~itment

was the

source of most attitude change. Predicting from Equation [1], this
could occuT either from a drastic increase in the importance of the
attitude for the

~s

between the time of commitment and are;ument, or

from the introduction of many more elements than were present in the
Commitment Only groups. The first possibility is given initial support
by the significant A X C interaction (Table I) indicating a differential effect of commitment dependent on the topic of argument. But the
simple effects show this difference was due to the action of only one
of the topics (disarmament) on tbe Ccrmnitrr.ent with Are;ument Ss
which resulted in a large consonant increase in position. The
explanation that importance increased does not account for the
significant consonant increase which occurred for

~s

who argued

Topic 1, or for the negative change which occurred for Dissonance
groups on both topics. It therefore seems hiehly likely that the
significant Commitment with Argument effects were due to the addition
of new cognitive elements during preparation and delivery of the
argument, altering the Equation (1] ratio sufficiently to result
in both consonant and dissonant change.
More change resulted in Commitment .with Argument groups
because of the many cognitions added during the argument. But the
chanf'e within Group CA-C was of higher magnitude than that for Group
CA-D althour.::h both were in the predicted direction. Since the location
of significant variance within these groups was the oral argument,
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1t

is likcl:r tha·t differences between them also or113inated. there.

The difference lies along the Consonance-Dissonance dimension,
suggesting some basic properties of one not shared by the other.
The problem can be resolved by examining the behavior of the Ss
under each condition preceding and during the areurnent,
In the Consonance condition §_committed himself to argue for
something he favored (or against something he opposed). In order
to pro:luce a convlncing are;ument in support of his position §_ then
had to recall relevant facts, ideas, opinions, and propositions
from memory, assemble them in a logical way, and 'Phrase them so
that they would be both audible and underst.andable. The entire process
required much seeking of information and quick judgement of its
relevance to the topic and the task. §_s were often so absorbed in
the task that they were visibly irritated when §.announced the time
remaining at minute intervals.

~

was therefore hishly motivated to

actively search for support for a position in which he had sorr.e interest
in ad.di tion to the commitment ma.de before the task was begun. Since
only relevant elements in agreement with the

ori~inal

position were

sought by §_, they combined additively resulting in a new position
more extreme than the old. The process is somewhat mo:lified for
Dissonance

~s,

however. When the commitment was made to argue against

something which ~supported (or the reverse) a slight amount of
dissonance may have been aroused, but at a level too low to detect
with the present design. Festinger (1957) maintains that when any
dissonance is aroused the person will attempt immediately to reduce
it, and if unsuccessful will at least actively avoid seeking new
information which would increase it. Dissonance

~s

were in a bind
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in this situationi they had committed themselves to a

discre~ant

task,

thus preventing the reduction of dissonance through denying the rele•
vance of the topic, and further, they were committed to producing
information supporting it. A compromise was then necessary to minimize
additional dissonance production while still satisfying the terms
of commitment. This could be done by choosing less convincing arguments
and insubstantial facts, and relating them in a less coherent way than
2 may have been capable of. Since the stimulus attitude against which
the new

infor11V~tion

was compared was the· same as that for Consonance

groups, the effect of the dissonance arguments was relatively reduced,
reflecting the Ss' need to satisfy two incompatible tasks simultaneously. No such incompatibilty occurred under Consonance and so
greater attitude change occurred,
Direct support for this explanantion would come from the tape
recordings made by the 2_s, As determined by independent raters the
arguments of Consonance 2.s should be judged to be more convincing,
coherent, and well-supported than those of Dissonance 2s, and
objectively be longer in length and contain more facts and opinions,
This leads also to the implication that if it were possible to equate
the arguments for quality and objective criteria, no differences
would be found in the magnitude of change produced by either Consonance
or Dissonance,
Although the shift within the Commitment Only groups only
approached significance (p <,10) it is worthwhile to examine the
results presented by them in relation to the overall pattern of
significant effects. Comparing between commitment levels, Figure 1
shows that the nerformance of the Dissonance groups (CO-D and CA-D)
is nearly parallel. Complete symmetry of the commitment effect would
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require the same parallel

the sirnificant CA-C

relation~hip bet~enn

group and nonsi5nificant CO-C, but this did not occur. The trend of
CO-C was reversed toward thP. dissonant direction, arrl

scores of all ten

~s

wa~

the only

in Group CO-C revcalf'd that nHhnueh only one

changed in the expected direction, six

their position two

chan~cd

or less points with three of these shewing no

chan~c

at all. The

troublesome reversal is due to three Ss who reversed. their positions
between measures by three, four, and five points respectively. Only
one §. on Topic 2 cha.need negatively as much as three points. With no
more evidence than this to explain n m::i.rr;inal trend it is reasonable
to conclude that the CO-C reversal was a chance occurrence or subject
error until an experiment can be designed to pursue the

proble~

more

directly. Such a study should take into account the variables of time
between commitment and postfost, §.'s familiarity with the topic, its
importance to §., and the clarity of the instructions. Ambieuity in
any of these factors mie;ht have resulted in

~·s

being unsure of his

own ability to perform the task arrl resolving the possible threat by
revising his

ori~inal

attitude toward a more

~eutral

position, which

would necessitate negative (dissonant) movement. This seems reasonable
in that only four of the twenty CO-C 2,s actually moved into the true
disagreement range (below

5 for Topic 1, above 7 for Topic 2). Also,

Kiesler (1968) notes that in previous studies the manipulation of
public commitment has inadvertently resulted in dissonance as a byproduct. Commitment might also make

pre-existin~

dissonance (between

individual elements of a single attitude) more &'llient when made public.
In either case resolution of dissonance would require negative shift,

-

which would be exPCcted
for CO-D Ss but not for CO-C -Ss. Such dissonance
-

4)
would be masked in both Commitment with Argument F,Toups by the influx
of new elements. This explanantion would be tenable if new data replicated the post-commitment negative shift, It would then be necessary to
devise a very homogeneous attitude stimulus to insure the independence
of commitment and dissonance.
It was noted above that a significant A X C interaction (F= 4.27,
1 and 72 df, p

<.05) was found to indicate a varying effect between

the topics on the Commitment treatments. The simple effects analysis
(Table VI) found the difference between groups to be significant

(F= 3.05, 3 and 76 ~f, p <.05) and showed that the performance of
Commitment with Argument

~s

was significantly greater than that of

Commitment Only ~s on Topic 2 ( t ob s = 4. OJ, 38 df, p < •001). The difference between groups on Topic 1 was nonsignificant. Some cognitive•property of Topic 2 therefore increased the effectiveness of the Commitrnent with Argument treatment, evidently in

~s

who changed in the

consonant direction. Equation [ 1] implies this property 'was the
importance of the attitude stimulus. Importance:as·a cognitive attribute
of attitude has been central to discussions of attitude change and
has been found to be a critical determinant of the relevance and
centrality of a particular position. Applied to commitment, it has
been shown to entirely control the power of the commitment act in
influencing overt chanee (Kiesler, Collins, and Miller, 1969).
Festinger (1957) delineates importance as one of the necessary antecedents of dissonance, with the amount of dissonance produced varying
directly with the importance of the obverse elements, again describing
a power relationship. Equation [1) shows why this should be so:
~NP

describes a multiplicative relationship between the individual
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cognitive cle:::ents

a~d

the weight civcn ea.ch· under 2_'n own value

system, the products of which are combined additively. The net effect
(power) of only a few elements is very ereat if held to be central by
2_; if they border on irrelevance even a large number of inputs would

have no actual effect. This theoretical scheme'.is not as specu1attve
as it might seem. Stimuli of all kinds are perpetuall¥ bombarding
the cognitive field, yet only a few arc deemed relevant en0uch to
affect an exist in~ at ti tndc, ar.d even fewer r"'c;11l t in larse-sc;i1.e
reorient~tions

of an entire cluster. Otherwise the

~tability

and

dura-1:.ion of an attitude would be so low a$ to prevent measurement.
Moreover, in tho present study a number of Ss in Topic 2 spontaneously commented about their personal concern over what were the
relevant issues associated with the topic, including world peace,
trust between nations, the historic role of the United States as a
leader in world affairs, and the cost of the arms race. Very few
comment$ of this type or ready areuments occurred on Topic 1 (one
exception was an education major who had experienced problems finding
a job because of school funding difficulties).
F..quation [ 1] implies that the greatP.r the number of elements
to which inportance is attached, the greater the resultant attitude
change. Conversely, the lower the importance of the topic, the lesser
the effect of the number of elements, whether large or small.
Assuming Topic 2 to have been of greater importance than Topic 1,
the qualitative results fulfill these predictions almost exactly.
Figure 2 illustrates that Topic 2 as an attitude stimulus resulted
in greater Posttest shift in both Commitment treatments

(althou~h

the Commitment Only mean difference is nonsignificant), while neither
Commitment level on Topic 1 was substantially altered (mean difference

between treatments

= .15). This pattern denotes the function of

both importance and commitment as factors in the change process.
It was seen that commitment itself possesses no inherent ability
to produce change independent of its association with substantive
attitude elements or clusters, and that the role of importance was
one of potentiating the effects produced by the interaction of all
other relevant factors enterine into the restoration of balance.
Commitment to a single important issue resulted in greater shift
than commitment to an unimportant one (Figure 2-C

means) while
2
commitment followed by many important elements resulted in greater
change than the same factors associated with an unimportant issue
(Figure 2-e

means). The overriding influence of importance was
2
underscored by the relative lack of movement of ~s in (unimportant)
Topic 1 even after the inclusion of the arguments. The multiplicative
--1perty of importance made it a critical determinant of the magnitude
attitude change.
Considering the role of commitment in attitude change according
to the relationships indicated by Equation [1} it is clear why the
main commitment hypothesis was disconfirmed. It was predicted that
commitment to defend or attack a position on a particular topic
would result in a more extreme position than that originally held,
and that the addition of verbal argument following commitment would
negate or reduce change instigated by the commitment act itself,
under both consonance and dissonance (Jellison and Mills, 1969;
Rabbie, Brehm, and Cohen, 1959). This was found to be incorrect,
with only marginal shift occurring following commitment by itself,
The difficulty posed by the discrepancy between these results arrl.
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those of Jellison and Mills is resolved. by examining the operational
definition of commitment in each study. Jellison and Mills asked their
§_s to agree to make a tape recording and sign a release in a way
almost identical to that used here, but the specifics of commitment
were ambiguous and general in that commitment. was made to an attitude
area (education) rather than to a single topic. Measurement was made
on related but not identical topics, further broadening the cluster
of stimuli to which commitment was associated. By delaying measurement
for a few minutes without any interpolated activity other than the
related topics questionnaire, Jellison and Mills allowed their Ss
to think about the stand they had committed. This nearly corresponds
to the Commitment with Argument treatment used here, less the overt
delivery of the argument. The present consonance results are therefore
basically in agreement with the previous study in that Jellison and
Mills failed to isolate commitment clearly and so measured the effect
of commitment plus thinking, related to a topic area. Under these
conditions Equation [1] would predict substantial shift. Similar
results were predicted for dissonant commitment, and likewise, were
d~sconfirmed. Rabbie, Brehm, and Cohen

(1959) hypothesized that

dissonance created by commitment to argue a discrepant position
might be reduced by either attitude change or overt verbalization
of the dissonant position. But their study failed to separate
commitment from the dissonance-producing stimuli in that high or
low justification was. used as the operational definition forbotn
dissonance and commitment. The failure of the present dissonant
commitment to produce dissonance reduction reflects the isolation
of commitment as a· discrete act. When commitment is clarified in
this way, it can be seen that the prediction of dissonance reduction

47
by either attitude shift or verbalization was not substantiated:
with well-defined discrete variables, no change took place unless
the dissonant position was verbalized. Whether any dissonance was
created by discrepant c6rnmitment cannot be determined from the measures
taken here; if so, it was not reduced through attitude change.
The only dependent variable used in this study was linear
attitude change along an arbitrary scale. This may have been a
limitation on the value of the results. Earlier studies (Brock and
Blackwood, 1962; Brehm and-Cohen, 1962;

R~bbie,

Brehm, and Cohen,

1959), have indicated commitment to have several effects in addition
to gross attitude shift, including cognitive anchoring, psychological
implication, and reality testing. Measures of these functions would
have indicated that although commitment alone did not affect overall
attitude shift, it may have specified the relationships which did
actually result in overt attitude change, Equation [ 1] implies that
a single element (such as commitment) has little power to change an
entire cluster, but that once several new (or important) elements are
made relevant, change will occur, The distinction is between the
qualitative and quantitative effects of commitment. While commitment
alone may not result in measureable change it may create the conditions
that do so by bringing previously unrelated elements into cognitive
relevance,
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SUMMARY

While the data do not support the original hypothesis the
consistent pattern of significant results does suggest an alternative
view of the role of commitment. A primary objective of the study was
to treat commitment as a discrete independent.variable, avoiding the
confusion resulting from inferential and partially confounded designs
employed in most previous commitment studies, and this objective was
achieved. Separation of commitment as a distinct variable allows
specific inferences to be made about its function in the attitude
change process. Kiesler (1968) summarizes the usefulness of the data:
Commitment must be conceptually distinguished from dissonance.
The first step (and a minim~l one) in such a distinction would
be to indicate the conditions under which one may vary commitment without affecting dissonance. Without at least this,. the
term commitment has no conceptual status independent of that
of dissonance. I would argue that without the independent status,
-the term commitment is superfluous to social-psycholoGical theory.
One of the initial steps in making the distinction is to answer
the question: fa commitment in and of itself motivating? I argue
that j_t is not, If one wants to take the opposite position, he
must clearly indicate the motivational properties of commitment
that are distinct from those of dissonance. [Kiesler, 1968, p, 455]
The findings agree with Kiesler's proposition:
1) While commitment has the status of a cognitive factor, it has
no motivating properties of its own which produce attitude change.
Change in this experiment following commitment was shown to be
dependent on the number and importance of cognitive elements with
which the commitment was associated. The primary hypothesis that
commitment would induce si91ificant attitude change was not sup-portr:d,
arreeinc; in this respect with the results of Kiesler, Pallak, and
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Kanouse (1968) and Kiesler and Sakumura (196'6), Brehm anrl Cohen
(1962) assert that commitment fixes tqe relationships between
relevant cognitive elements, increasing their resistance to change
and thereby restricting the ways in which balance may be restored,
The data agree with this proposition in that change took place
following both consonant and dissonant commitment, but required
that a large number of elements be present for the shift to achieve
significance, The function of commitment itself in this regard is
unclear because of the lack of' a no-treatment control participating
in the argument manipulations, Presumably such a group would have
many more avenues of restoring balance after stimulus' input and
would show less -conseq uent-,shift.
2) The function of commitment (and areument) was shown to be
the same under both consonance and dissonance, but the resultant
amount of change under dissonance was reduced, This was seen to
have been the result of conflicting motivations created by dissonance,
in which

~

was at once bound by his commitment to perform the task

and also desired to avoid the greater dissonance created by it.
A compromise occurred which resulted in less attitude change,
probably through ineffective information seeking.

3) The results also provide support for general dissonance
theory (see p. 2). As predicted by dissonance theory, unambiguous
commitment followed by discrepant information introduced during
the argument resulted in dissonance reduction through attitude change.

4) The importance of the topic was found to strongly affect
the magnitude of change prOO.uced, varying differentially with the
number of elements present in the treatment. Iiike commitment,
importance acted as a variable which by itself had no motivating
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properties, but acted within the dynamic balance process to increase
the salience of some factors and resulted in much greater overt change.
Public commitment produced no motivation to change attitude
positions by itself, but did bind the

~to

the performance of a task

which incorporated motivating factors. Two primary factors were found
to be consonant or dissonant imbalance, and issue i.mportance.
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APPENDIX A
Two subforms of the attitude scale, composed of 62 items
taken from three separate scales (Lerner, Pendorf, and Emery,

1971; Comrey and Newmeyer, 1965; Kerlinger, 1963) were used, one
for each part of the experiment (31 items). A reliability study
was conducted on a comparable but separate population precedine
the experiment to determine inter-form reliability and compatability
of the items. The percentage of
for Part II (item mean of

3-S

~s

falling into ranges acceptable

or 7-9) was checked, indicating

overall suitability of the composite scales for the experiment.
Inasmuch as each of the original scales was designed to discriminate
along a liberal-conservative dimension (each reporting high reliability
figures for this: Kerlinger, split-half reliability .78, .?9; Lerner,
Pendorf, and Emery, t-test discrimination between young and old
at p

~s

<.05 on 89.5% of the items; Comrey and Newmeyer, inter-form

correlation

= • 96),

the initial reliability study was primarily

concerned with the ability of each of the subforms to detect §.s
along this dimension as indicated by the percentage of the sarnpTe
that scored within the desired ranges. About

30%

did so on two items

which were then used for the main study:
Topic 1 - "Federal government aid for the construct'ion of
schools is long overdue and should be instituted as permanent policy."
Topic 2 - This country should disarm regardless of whether or
not other countries do.
These items were shown to be almost completely uncorrelated

(r = .03),

APPENDIX B
PRETEST

1

2

Very Strongly
Disagree

4

3

5

6
Neutral

7

8

9

10

11

Very Strongly
Agree

1. Individuals who are against churches and religions should not be
allowed to teach in college.

2. Laws dealing with drugs, such as marijuana, are unjust.

3. Employers should

be prevented by law from hirine; only people of

their own race.

4. My conscience would bother me if I killed a man in war.

5.

Laws which benefit the people are more important than laws which
strengthen the nation.

6. Regulation of business by government usually does more harm than
gooi,

7, The federal government has too much power over citizens and local
government.

8, Indiv:iduals. with the abi1 ity "'·nd foresight to earn and accumulate
wealth should have the right to enjoy that wealth without government
interference,

9, Every child should have religious instruction.
10, Government laws and regulations should be such as first to ensure
the prosperity of business since the prosperity of all depends on the
prosperity of business.
11. Federal gove:rnment aid for the const"l'.'llction of' schools is long
overdue, and should be instituted as permanent· pol icy.•
12, The United

n~tions

should be wholeheartedly supported by all of us.

13, Our country should prepare to employ every available weapon to
destroy any major power that seriously attacks us.

14. The government should guarantee every citizen enough to eat.

15.

The United States should work peacefully for a strong world governemnt.

16. Science and society would both be better off if scientists took
no part in politics.
17. When something is run by the government it is apt to be innefficient
and wasteful.
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18, There should be no lnterference with business and trarle,

19. Our laws give too much protection to criminals.
20. Society should be quicker to throw out old ideas and traditions and
to adopt new thinJdng and customs.
21, This country should disarm regardless of whether or not other countries
do,

22, The United States should be willing to surrender some of its rights
to strengthen the United Nations,
2J, All individuals who are intellectually capable of benefit,ting from
it should p,et college education, at public expense if necessary.

24. True democracy is limited in the United States because of the
priviliges enjoyed by business and industry.

25.

Universities should not oppose radical groups, but should provide
them with the protection that others have,

26, Funds for school construction should come from state and federal
government loans at no interest or very low interest.
27. If called upon to do so, a citizen should be willing to sacrifice
his life for his country.
28. Laws dealing with drug conviction are too harsh,
q

29. It is moral to flee to qnad.a to escape the draft,

JO.

Marriages between persons of different races should be socially
acceptable.

31, A first consideration in any society is the protection of property
rights,
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POSTTEST
1

2

Very Strongly
Disagree

3

5

6
?
Neutral

8

Q
'

10

11

Very Stron~ly
Agree

1. The average man today is getting· less than his rightful share of
the national wealth.
2. A first consideration in any society is the protection of property
rir;hts.

3. A greater degree of governme"!"lt control over business would result
in a weakening of this country's economy.

4. Some sort of Teligious education shouln be given in the public schools.

5.

Laws dealing with drug conviction are too harsh.

6. Our laws give too much protection to criminals,

7. When something is run by the government, it is apt to be innefficient
and wasteful.

8, Universities should not oppose radical groups, but should provide
them with the same protection that others have,

9. The government should guarantee every citizen enoueh to eat.
10. Society should be quicker to throw out old ideas and traditions and
to adopt new thinking arrl customR,

11. All individuals who are intellectually capable of benefitting from
it should eet colle13e education, at public expense if necessary.
12, Regulation of business by government usually does more harm than goal,.

13. Every child should have religious instruction.
ilk, The United States should be willing to surrerder some of its rights
to strengthen the United Nations.

1). Federal government aid for the construction of schools is long
overdue, and should be instituted as permanent policy.

16. The federal government has too much power over citizens arrl local
government.

17. 011r country shou1<l prepare to employ every avaHable weapon to
destroy any major power that seriously attacks us.
18. If c:i.11€"1 u-pon to do so, a citizen should be willing to sacrifice his
life for his country.

59
19, Science and society
pg.rt in politics.

l~:rould

both be better off if scientists took no

20, Government laws and regulations should be such as to first ensure

the prosperity of business since the prosperity of all depends on
prosperity of business,

21. Laws which benefit the
strenethen the nation.

peo~le

are more important than laws which

22. The United States should work peacefully for a strong world government,
23, Individuals with the ab3lity and foresiGht to earn and accumulate
weal th should have the right to enjoy t.hat weal th without, r;overnment
interference and refrnlation.
24, There should be no government interference with business and trade.

25, This country should disarm regardless of whether or not other countries
do.
26, Funds for school construction should come from state and federal
government loans at no interest or very low interest,
27. The United Nations should be
us,

28,

whol~heartedly

supported by all of

Tru~

democracy is limited in the Unieted States because of the
priviliges enjoyed by business and industry,

29, Large fortunes should be taxed fairly heavily over and above income
taxes,
JO, Employers should
their own race.

be prevented by law from hiring only people of

31, The gradual social ormership of industry needs to be encouraeed if
we are ever to cure some of the ills of society,
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UA!.E
~---------~--~------~~------

1) Indicate the

aliiOu..1t

of real of'fort you put into fornulntint; your
9

11
10
Vecy i.1Uch

2) How convincing do you t:-.i!llc your a.r5w:tcnt. is?
l
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Not convincin:; at all

9

10
11
Very convincinr;

5} Hou 't·.>ell thou;;!!t out is your ar!;UJllent?
l
2
3
~
5
6
7
Poorly

9

3

5

6

7

8

very l i t·;ie

-

8

10

11

Vory •roll

4) Ineicate hoi7 L'lUCh pcrsori.al involvcncnt you felt >rhilc £or::llllatil15 and
rccordin~ your ar;;uracnt.
i

2

s

:£.To involvemen·i:;

4

s · 6

1

a

9

lo
11
Very mucn involvement

5} Do you think you understand T:hat tho exporiracn·t is about?
If

so~

explain briefly:

------
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